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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sarah Joann Fencl appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment. 
Following her guilty pleas to driving under the influence and being a persistent violator, 
she was sentenced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing her both 
because it failed to realize that the minimum five year sentence for a persistent violator 
enhancement does not require the five years be a fixed term and because it sentenced 
her to an excessive sentence when it imposed sentence without giving proper weight or 
consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in this case. Furthermore, Fencl 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion 
because the district court clearly continued to misunderstand what minimum sentence is 
required when a defendant is subject to a persistent violator enhancement. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On September 26, 2013, an Information was filed charging Ms. Fencl with felony, 
driving under the influence. (R., pp.51-52.) An Information Part II was also filed 
charging Ms. Fencl with being a persistent violator. (R,.pp.68-69.) The charges were 
the result of Ms. Fencl failing field sobriety tests after a traffic stop. (PSI, p.3.) 
Ms. Fencl entered guilty pleas to both the driving under the influence and 
persistent violator charges. (Tr., p.11, L.1 - p.13, L.22; R., p.71.) At the sentencing 
hearing, the prosecution requested imposition of a unified sentence of fifteen years, with 
five years fixed. {Tr., p.24, Ls.3-8.) Defense counsel recommended that the district 
court consider "other alternatives besides simply warehousing" Ms. Fencl. (Tr., p.29, 
1 
) The district court imposed a unified sentence 
(R., pp.85-87.) During sentencing, the district 
years, with 
noted that the 
persistent violator enhancement, it limits the sentences that I can impose since I am 
imposing a prison sentence in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) 
Ms. Fencl filed a timely Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Sentence I.C.R. 35. 
(R., pp.92-94.) The district court denied the motion. (R., pp.106-108.) Ms. Fencl also 




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion, both at sentencing and in denying the 
Rule 35 motion, when it failed to recognize that the persistent violator statute did 
not require the imposition of a minimum sentence of five years fixed, but a 
minimum unified sentence of five years? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Ms. Fencl, a 
unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, following her pleas of guilty 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The Rule 
35 Motion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator Statute Did Not 
Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years Fixed, But A Minimum 
Unified Sentence Of Five Years 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court believed that it had to sentence her to a 
minimum fixed sentence of five years because of her plea of guilty to a persistent 
violator enhancement. Idaho Code §19-2514, the persistent violator statute, provides 
that a sentence enhanced by the persistent violator enhancement must receive a 
minimum five year sentence, not a minimum five year fixed sentence. The district 
court's belief that it must impose a minimum of five years fixed was misplaced and, 
ultimately, to an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion. 
B. Standards of Review 
A court properly exercises its discretion when it (1) correctly perceives the issue 
to be one of discretion, (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, 
and (3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 
771 (2010). This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of 
statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, Both At Sentencing And In Denying The 
Rule 35 Motion, When It Failed To Recognize That The Persistent Violator 
Statute Did Not Require The Imposition Of A Minimum Sentence Of Five Years 
Fixed, But A Minimum Unified Sentence Of Five Years 
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The Idaho State Supreme Court has held that if a sentence is within the statutory 
maximum, it will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellant affirmatively shows a 
"clear abuse of discretion." State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982); 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573 (1979). A sentence may represent a "clear abuse of 
discretion" if it is shown to be unreasonable upon the facts of the case. Toohi/1, 103 
Idaho at 568. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is a narrow rule that allows a trial court to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time, or to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within 
120 days. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009); State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 
735, (2007); I.C.R. 35. "Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or whether it was 
imposed in an illegal manner is a question of law, over which we exercise free review." 
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 735. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 
35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea 
for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly 
severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 
Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
During sentencing, the district court noted that "[g]iven the persistent violator 
enhancement, it limits the sentences that I can impose since I am imposing a prison 
sentence in this case." (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-5.) The district court then imposed a unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (Tr., p.33, Ls.6-10.) The statement from 
the district court suggests that it believed it had to impose a fixed term of five years. 
However, Ms Fencl acknowledges that the exact meaning of this perceived limitation on 
sentencing discretion was not entirely clear until the issue was discussed further during 
the Rule 35 process. 
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(R., 
filed a timely Defendant's Motion to 
) In her motion she noted that the court had 
I.C.R. 35. 
during the 
sentencing hearing that the persistent violator statute limited the Court's discretion. (R., 
p.92.) Ms. Fencl requested that the district court consider the imposition of a lesser 
fixed term. (R., p.94.) Specifically, the motion stated "[d]efendant respectfully requests 
that this Court reconsider her sentence of five years fixed followed by ten years 
indeterminate and consider a lesser fixed portion." (R., p.94 (emphasis added).) The 
State filed an Objection to Motion to Reduce Sentence asserting that while a five year 
sentence must be imposed, "[t]here is no indication that the Court believed that the 
imposed sentence could not be suspended or that it had to be fixed." (R., p.103-105.) 
The district couti then denied the motion. (R., pp.106-108.) In ruling on the motion, the 
district court specifically noted that, "[t]he Defendant's motion for reconsideration 
acknowledges a fixed term of five years was required but asks the court, in its 
discretionary [sic], for leniency in a reduction of the indeterminate portion of the 
sentence." (R., pp.106-108.) 
The district court failed to recognize that the motion was not for a specific 
reduction of the indeterminate portion of the sentence, but did specifically mention a 
request for a reduction of the fixed portion of the sentence. As such, there was no 
"acknowledgement" on the part of the defendant that a fixed term of five years was 
required. Further, this statement from the district court shows that it believed, contrary 
to the State's assertion, that the persistent violator statue requires a minimum fixed five 
year sentence. 1 As such, the district court clearly did not recognize that it had the 
1 Ms. Fencl acknowledges that the district court recognized that it could suspend 
whatever sentence it imposed. The issue on appeal is limited to whether the district 
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discretion to impose a fixed 
sentence was at least five years. 
of less t11an five years as long as the unified 
1. Idaho Code § 19-2514 Does Not Require A Minimum Five Year Fixed 
Sentence 
Judicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's 
literal words. State v. Glenn, 156 Idaho , _, 319 P .3d 1191 , 1193-94 (2014 ); 
State v. Bumight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. 
App. 2000). The language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious and rational 
meaning. Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied according to 
its plain terms, and there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or 
rules of statutory interpretation. Bumight, 132 Idaho at 695; Escobar, 134 Idaho 389. 
Id. 
Idaho Code§ 19-2514 states the following: 
Persistent violator -- Sentence on third conviction for felony. Any person 
convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony . . . shall be 
considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction shall 
be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of correction 
which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and said term may 
extend to life. 
a. Idaho Code§ 19-2514 Is Unambiguous 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the statutory language is unambiguous as to whether the 
statute requires a fixed term of imprisonment. Had the legislature intended for the 
persistent violator enhancement to require a fixed term of imprisonment, the legislature 
would have specifically stated as such. For example, ,the Idaho Court of Appeals found 
in State v. Patterson, 148 Idaho 166, 169 (Ct. App. 2009), that Idaho Code§ 37-27398, 
court recognized that it had the discretion to impose a fixed sentence of less than five 
years. 
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regarding fixed minimum in drug can be distingu 
Code§ 1 4 in an significant 
Similar to many felony penalty statutes, I.C. § 19-2514 requires only that 
a defendant "be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of 
correction." Idaho Code Section 37-27398(b), however, requires that a 
defendant "be sentenced to a fixed minimum term of confinement to the 
custody of the state board of correction." (Emphasis added). Therefore, 
unlike the persistent violator statute, the language of I.C. § 37-27398 
expresses the legislature's unambiguous intent that its violation result in 
actual imprisonment. 
Patterson, 148 Idaho at 169. 
Idaho 
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 18-4004 has also specifically delineated when a 
mandatory minimum sentence should be imposed following a murder conviction. It 
states: 
[E]very person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by 
death or by imprisonment for life ... or if the death penalty is not sought, 
the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of 
confinement of not less than ten (10) years during which period of 
confinement the offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or 
credit or reduction of sentence for good conduct, except for meritorious 
service. Every person guilty of murder of the second degree is punishable 
by imprisonment not less than ten ( 10) years and the imprisonment may 
extend to life. 
Id. (emphasis added). As such, an individual convicted of first degree murder must 
serve a minimum sentence of ten years fixed, while a defendant convicted of second 
degree murder must only receive an aggregate minimum sentence of ten years. 
Based upon the plain language of the statute, a defendant sentenced under the 
persistent violator enhancement is not subject to a five year fixed minimum sentence. 
The required sentence is merely that the aggregate sentence, comprised of determinate 
and indeterminate time, be a minimum of five years. 
b. Alternatively, Should This Court Determine Idaho Code § 19-2514 Is 
Ambiguous, The Rule Of Lenity Dictates An Interpretation Allowing For 
8 
The District Court To Sentence A Defendant To An Minimum 
Aggregate Sentence Of Five Years 
The principle of lenity mandates that criminal be narrowly and, 
where ambiguity exists, in a manner that provides leniency toward defendants. State v. 
Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103(2008); State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct.App.1999). 
In Harrington, the state argued that the language of the persistent violator 
statute, Idaho Code § 19-2514, removed a district court's discretion to suspend a 
sentence imposed on a persistent violator by requiring a mandatory aggregate term of 
at least five years. Id. at 566. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the statute was 
ambiguous and, therefore, the rule of lenity dictated an interpretation that allowed the 
district court to suspend the sentence imposed. Id. The Court further explained its 
reasoning in a relevant footnote: 
It should be noted that it took an amendment to the Idaho State 
Constitution to abolish the inherent powers of courts to suspend 
sentences as to legislatively imposed mandatory minimum terms of 
imprisonment. Id. Const. Art. V, § 13. Where there has been no legislative 
action declaring a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, thusly 
canceling a court's power to suspend sentences, such power to suspend 
should be preserved. 
Id. at 566 n. 5. 
Should this Court again find that the persistent violator statute is ambiguous, 
Ms. Fencl asserts that, applying the rule of lenity, the Court should find that the 
minimum five year sentence only requires a minimum aggregate sentence of five years, 
not a minimum fixed sentence of five years. 
2. Because Idaho Code § 19-2514 Does Not Require A Mandatory Minimum 
Sentence Of Five Years Fixed, The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
From the district court's statements, it is clear that it recognized the issue as 
discretionary, but did not understood the bounds of its discretion. Because the district 
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did that it has discretion to impose 
court was unable to effectively apply its sentencing 
district 
and, as such, ultimately 
abused its sentencing discretion in both the original sentencing and in denying the Rule 
35 motion. 
II. 
Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon 
Ms. Fencl, A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following Her 
Pleas Of Guilty To Driving Under The Influence And A Persistent Violator Enhancement 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court does not find that the district court abused 
its sentencing discretion through its understanding of the persistent violator sentencing 
requirement, Ms. Fencl alternatively asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified 
sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Fencl does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Fencl must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992))). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
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of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001 ))). 
Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court failed to give proper weight or 
consideration to the mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, she asserts 
that the district court failed to give proper consideration to her admitted substance 
abuse problem and desire for treatment. Idaho courts have previously recognized that 
substance abuse and a desire for treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor 
by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 
(1982). 
Ms. Fencl began using alcohol and marijuana at the age of 13. (PSI, p.11.) She 
was using alcohol about every other day prior to the instant offense. (PSI, p.12.) 
Although she has participated in several treatment programs and believes she has the 
tools to remain sober, she has not used them. (PSI, p.12.) She acknowledges that she 
is an alcoholic and now realizes that "alcohol has ruined my life." (PSI, p.12.) It was 
recommended that Ms. Fencl participate in Level 2.1 Intensive Outpatient Treatment. 
(PSI, p.15.) 
Additionally, Ms Fencl has expressed her remorse for committing the instant 
offense and acknowledged her substance abuse issues. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 
204 (Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed, "In light 
of Alberts' expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his 
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 
Idaho at 204. 
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In her comments to the district court, Ms. Fencl noted that: 
I have had a love/hate relationship with alcohol since the age of 1 
As I've neared the completion of a bachelors degree, I've realized that my 
dream of helping other women seek a better life after prison could not be 
realized [without] being sober myself and truly want life beyond the bar 
stool. Obtaining an education has helped me envision this better life and 
given me a reason to quit. I also want to have a good relationship [with] 
my kids and continue getting to know them and my future grandkids -
quality of life I've denied myself in the past is only possible as long as a 
sober women and I feel I deserve that as well as the peace of mind that it 
brings. 
(PSI, p.13.) At the sentencing hearing, Ms. Fencl stated: 
My record is terrible, and I take full responsibility for what I did. And I feel 
the sting of a terrible record all the time. Even not by the court, but, in life, 
so, yeah, I've made some horrible decisions, but I don't know. I don't want 
to drink anymore. I mean, I say that all the time, but I'm 41, and I'm not 
getting any younger and I feel it. And I do want to get a degree and help 
people, but I couldn't do that being a drunk, so, no matter what comes out 
of this, you know, I feel it when I'm on probation or parole or even when, 
you know, there's nobody looking over my shoulder, I feel it. That it's 
ruined my life. I've wasted my youth on it. So, yeah; that's all I have to 
say. 
(Tr., p.30, Ls.7-20.) 
Additionally, Ms. Fencl has several positive features. She has been attending 
BSU. (PSI, p.8.) She is working toward a degree in sociology and is only 25 credits 
away from receiving her degree. (PSI, p.8.) 
Ms. Fencl has also been able to maintain employment. (PSI, pp.9-10.) Prior to 
her most recent conviction, she was working at Maverik and was highly praised for her 
work performance while employed there. (PSI, pp.9-10.) Ms. Devore noted that, "She 
has been an exemplary employee. She shows up for all of her scheduled shifts, and 
comes in when we need her. She works well with her co-workers and dutifully 
maintains the store. She is hard working and well organized. Her continued 
employment is an asset to Maverik." (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Wafford wrote, "Sarah Fencl has 
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been working for me I moved to this as the assistant manager in November. 
I find her work ethics attitude a benefit to the whole team as well. I feel that her 
continued employment with Maverik, would help her in becoming a productive member 
of society, her attitude, and helpfulness would be missed by Everyone if she were to 
leave for any reason." (PSI, p.10.) 
Idaho courts have previously recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the 
trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Ms. Fencl suffers from mental heath issues. She 
has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety. (PSI, p.10.) At the time the 
presentence report was completed, she was taking Prozac, Abilify, Gabepentin, and 
Concerta to assist with her depression, anxiety and attention deficit disorder. (PSI, 
p.10-11 . ) She started receiving treatment for depression at the age of 11 and attention 
deficit disorder at the age of 35. (PSI, p.11.) At the age of 40, Ms. Fencl was 
prescribed medication to stabilize her mood and treat he anxiety. (PSI, p.11.) She 
indicated this medication regime has been very helpful and she wishes she had started 
it sooner. (PSI, p.11.) She was also participating in counseling through Boise State 
University. (PSI, p.11.) 
Furthermore, in State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that family and friend support were factors that should be considered in the 
Court's decision as to what is an appropriate sentence. Id. Ms. Fencl's family supports 
her. Her father wrote a letter of support for her noting that she has serious substance 
abuse issues and asking that she be put in a treatment court. (PSI, p.6.) He also noted 
that she is motivated to learn, receives fair grades in college, has always been a hard 
worker, and has always been able to maintain employment." (PSI, p.6.) Ms. Fencl's 
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daughter also wrote a letter of support noting that had seen a positive change 
in Ms. Fencl recently and that would love to her come live near so she 
could have a better support network. (PSI, p.8.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Fencl asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her. She asserts that 
had the district court properly considered her substance abuse, mental health issues, 
friend and family support, remorse, attendance as BSU, and strong employment history, 
it would have crafted a sentence that focused on her further rehabilitation rather than 
incarceration. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Fencl respectfully requests that this Court remand her case for a new 
sentencing hearing in which the district court must consider the proper application of the 
persistent violator enhancement. Alternatively, she requests that the order denying her 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. Alternatively, she requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it 
deems appropriate. 
DATED this 12th day of August, 2014. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED ' 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 day of August, 201 I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRI by causing to placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
SARAH JOANN FENCL 
INMATE #42233 
ADAMS COUNTY JAIL 
PO BOX 64 
COUNCIL ID 83612 
LYNN NORTON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
150 S 4TH E STE 5 
MOUNTAIN HOME ID 83647 
GEORGE C PATTERSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
410 S ORCHARD ST STE 124A 
BOISE ID 83705-1210 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
EAA/ns 
NANCY SANl2>PVAL 
Administrative Assistant 
LJ 
15 
